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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AN ANALYSIS OF 1982 WISCONSIN DIVORCE
CASES ADDRESSING ISSUES OF
PROPERTY DIVISION AND
MAINTENANCE
In 1982 the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down a
number of decisions' dealing with property division and
maintenance awards in divorce actions. Each of these opin-
ions serves to interpret and augment the Wisconsin Divorce
Reform Act of 1977.2 The statutes set forth in that Act inau-
gurated "no fault" divorce in Wisconsin and provided for a
presumption of an equal division of marital property that
could be modified by a number of factors.3 As this review of
recent decisions will illustrate, the statutory considerations
will require ongoing interpretation by the courts.
Property division was formerly predicated on the pre-
sumption that the spouse making little or no financial contri-
1. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 321 N.W.2d 237 (1982); Dixon v. Dixon,
107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d
391 (1982); Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982); Roberto v.
Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17,318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1,
318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Vander Perren v. Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d 219, 313
N.W.2d 813 (1982).
Also during 1982 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued the following divorce
decisions: Corcoran v. Corcoran, 109 Wis. 2d 36, 324 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1982)
(burden of proof in custody review); Washington v. Hicks, 109 Wis. 2d 10, 325
N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1982) (ex-spouse's rights to life insurance proceeds); Mack v.
Mack, 108 Wis. 2d 604, 323 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1982) (personal injury settlement
in property division); Sommer v. Sommer, 108 Wis. 2d 586, 323 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App.
1982) (child support modification); In re RJ.G., 107 Wis. 2d 704, 321 N.W.2'd 354
(Ct. App. 1982) (child custody); Schlinder 4.Schlinder, 107 Wis. 2d 695, 321 N.W.2d
343 (1982) (validity of foreign divorce); Bouchard v. Bouchard, 107 Wis. 2d 632, 321
N.W.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1982) (valuation of pension rights); Corliss v. Corliss, 107 Wis.
2d 338, 320 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1982) (valuation of pension plans, real estate inter-
est, family support and attorney fees); Sandy v. Sandy, 106 Wis. 2d 230, 316 N.W.2d
164 (Ct. App. 1982) (eviction of spouse from homestead).
2. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560 (codified as amended at
Wis. STAT. ch. 767 (1981-1982)). See generally Comment, The Displaced Homemaker
and the Divorce Process in Wisconsin, 1982 Wis. L. Rnv. 941 (for another analysis of
recent Wisconsin cases).
3. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
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bution would receive one-third of the estate acquired during
the marriage. The present statute presumes that there will
be a fifty-fifty split,5 but as Jasper v. Jasper6 illustrates, when
a couple marries after one partner has already established a
career, that partner may not have to divide property equally
with the nonearning spouse. Two other 1982 decisions,
Lundberg v. Lundberg7 and Roberto v. Brown,8 which are
discussed elsewhere in this volume,9 address the property di-
vision issue in situations where marriages break up after one
party has devoted years of effort to financing the career
training of the other party.
On the question of maintenance the 1982 court decisions
displayed solicitude for the plight of the displaced home-
maker. In Dixon v. Dixon 1o the court turned aside an appeal
by a woman claiming that fault should be considered in set-
ting the level of support, but also decided that a judgment
providing for limited maintenance can subsequently be
modified or extended." Dixon involved a forty-nine year
old woman who had been primarily a homemaker during
the twenty-five year marriage and whose minor children
were teenagers.
In Bahr v. BahrI2 the court ruled that a maintenance
award of $18,000 per year to an older fulltime homemaker
with limited prospects for employment, whose former spouse
earned over $300,000 per year, was so unreasonably low as
to constitute an abuse of discretion. The court recom-
mended that trial courts begin their maintenance evaluations
with the proposition that the dependent partner may be enti-
tled to fifty percent of the total earnings of both parties.13
This survey of recent decisions will trace their historical
underpinnings and analyze their potential ramifications.
4. See Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 380, 173 N.W.2d 142, 143 (1970).
5. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
6. 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982).
7. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
8. 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982).
9. See Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree
Upon Dissolution ofa Marriage, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 495 (1983).
10. 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 118-35, 148-76.
12. 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
13. Id at 84-85, 318 N.W.2d at 398.
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While the ideal of modem divorce law is a clean break be-
tween the parties and the economic rehabilitation of the de-
pendent spouse, the expectation of self-sufficiency may not
be realistic under present economic and social conditions.
Based on these recent decisions, it appears that family
courts, which are courts of equity, are being encouraged to
apply the property division and maintenance statutes flex-
ibly to avoid harsh results for either party.
I. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN WISCONSIN
A. History
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined the division
of marital property as "the fair, equitable and just division
of the marital estate, or assets of the parties as they exist at
the time of the divorce. That is, the assets which the parties
brought into the marriage and/or acquired during the mar-
riage." 14 Prior to 1970, a property division of one-third of the
marital estate to the wife and two-thirds to the husband was
considered an appropriate starting point, though not a maxi-
mum or minimum.' 5 This standard was derived from a 1914
case, Gauger v. Gauger,16 in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated that "it has been pretty well established that a
clear third of the whole is a liberal allowance to the wife,
subject to be increased or decreased according to special cir-
cumstances . . . . 17
In a 1970 case, Lacey v. Lacey, "' the court rejected the
one-third formula as a starting point, holding that the "ma-
terial facts and factors" present in each case must guide the
property division.' 9 Lacey was a landmark decision in
14. Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 75 Wis. 2d 78, 82-83, 248 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1976).
15. Jordan v. Jordan, 44 Wis. 2d 471,476, 171 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1969); Schneider
v. Schneider, 15 Wis. 2d 245, 247, 112 N.W.2d 584, 585 (1961); Manske v. Manske, 6
Wis. 2d 605, 607, 95 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1959).
16. 157 Wis. 630, 147 N.W. 1075 (1914).
17. Id at 633, 147 N.W. at 1077.
18. 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
19. Id at 382, 173 N.W.2d at 144. Referring to its statement in Gauger, 157 Wis.
at 633, 147 N.W. at 1077, the court said:
We do not read the quote as establishing an exact formula or mandatory mea-
suring stick for property division in divorce cases. We find in the full quota-
tion a clear recognition that the formula to be followed in a particular case
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which the court recognized that marriage is a partnership2°
and that the contribution of a homemaking wife may be as
great as or greater than those of a wage earning wife.21 The
opinion enunciated many of the guidelines later to be codi-
fied in the Wisconsin marital property division statute:22
[R]elevant factors certainly include the length of the mar-
riage, the age and health of the parties, their ability to sup-
port themselves, liability for debts or support of children,
general circumstances, including grievous misconduct, al-
though a division is not a penalty imposed for fault.
Whether the property award is in lieu of or in addition to
alimony payments is a material factor. Whether the prop-
erty was acquired during the marriage or brought to the
marriage makes a difference. 3
The court's rejection of the one-third rule of thumb and
emphasis on an equitable result may have been a timely re-
flection of the burgeoning women's movement for equality.
The Lacey court did not suggest, however, that a fifty-fifty
division of property should be the starting point or norm.24
It analogized property division to a balancing of scales:
depends upon and derives from the material facts and factors present in such
case.
The court went on to say that, even read in its entirety, Gauger "stress[ed] the starting
point too much, the finishing point too little. It is the equitableness of the result
reached that must stand the test of fairness on review." Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 382, 173
N.W.2d at 144.
20. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 382, 173 N.W.2d at 144.
21. Id at 383, 173 N.W.2d at 145.
22. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
23. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 383-84, 173 N.W.2d at 145. The substance of this quota-
tion was codified in Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971), which provided in pertinent part:
The court may also finally divide and distribute the estate ... of either party
between the parties ... after having given due regard to the legal and equita-
ble rights of each party, the length of the marriage, the age and health of the
parties, the liability of either party for debts or support of children, their re-
spective abilities and estates, whether the property award is in lieu of or in
addition to alimony, the character and situation of the parties and all the cir-
cumstances of the case ....
24. At the time of the Lacey decision the separate estate, if any, of the divorcing
wife could not be disturbed for the benefit of the husband. This may have been one
reason why the court did not establish an equal division of the estate as a starting
point but directed the lower courts to consider all relevant factors, including the wife's
separate estate:
Since the Wisconsin statute provides that separate property of the wife, pos-
sessed by her before the marriage or acquired solely by her efforts, is to be
awarded to her, the amount of such separate estate is a proper factor to con-
[Vol. 66:529
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All factors favorable to either party must be placed on the
scales, and the scales must then balance. The responsibility
of the trial court is to fairly, equitably and justly divide the
marital property between the spouses, and where it begins
is not crucial. It is where it ends that is to be reviewed on
appeal.25
Although a fifty-fifty division of property was not a pre-
sumption at the time of the Lacey case, the court did say that
such a division might be appropriate after a lengthy mar-
26 Mranriage, and Mr. and Mrs. Lacey's marital estate was, in fact,
ultimately so divided.27 In cases decided after Lacey, an
equal or nearly equal division of marital property was not an
unheard of result;28 and, if the equities of the situation
leaned in favor of the wife, she received a greater than fifty
percent share.29 Nevertheless, an award to the wife of more
than one-third of the property continued to be considered
"substantial" and was required to be well justified:
The following factors have been considered particularly
relevant in determining whether the trial court has erred in
awarding a substantial share (generally considered to be
more than one-third) of the marital estate to the wife: (1) a
long period of marriage; (2) complete lack of any separate
sider in determining how much of the husband's or marital property is also to
be awarded to her.
Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 384, 173 N.W.2d at 145. Unlike the other Lacey factors, how-
ever, the wife's separate estate was not one of the factors codified in the 1973 property
division statute because, by that time, the legislature had already made the estate of
either spouse subject to division and distribution. WIs. STAT. § 247.26 (1973). See
also Wilberscheid v. Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 46-47 n.7, 252 N.W.2d 76, 80 n.7
(1977) (construing Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971)).
25. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 382, 173 N.W.2d at 144.
26. Id at 382-83, 173 N.W.2d at 145.
27. Lacey v. Lacey, 61 Wis. 2d 604, 611, 213 N.W.2d 80, 84 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Carty v. Carty, 87 Wis. 2d 759, 764, 275 N.W.2d 888 (1979) (an
award to the wife of almost 47% of the estate was upheld); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis.
2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975) (the trial court's award to the wife of 39% of the net
estate was raised by the supreme court to 48%); Heiting v. Heiting, 64 Wis. 2d 110,
218 N.W.2d 334 (1974) (an approximately equal division was upheld).
29. In Wilberscheid v. Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 252 N.W.2d 76 (1977), the
wife was awarded two-thirds of the marital estate where funds she had saved prior to
the marriage as well as monies she had inherited were used to purchase the couple's
unsuccessful tavern business and the marital homestead. Mrs. Wilberscheid had also
worked outside the home for 13 years, and her income had been the mainstay of the
family. Id at 42, 252 N.W.2d at 78. See also Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis. 2d 631,
242 N.W.2d 165 (1976) (award to the wife of 51% of the marital estate upheld as not
excessive).
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estate in the wife coupled with her inability to support her-
self; (3) the misconduct of the husband contributing to the
breakup of the marriage; and (4) amount of permanent ali-
mony awarded to the wife. 30
B. Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Property Division
In 1977 much of the Wisconsin Family Code was revised.
Of major significance was the enactment of a "no-fault" di-
vorce statute In keeping with the no-fault standard, the
new property division statute32 provided for a fifty-fifty divi-
sion (except for gifts and inherited property) 33 as a starting
point: "The court shall presume that all other property ex-
cept inherited property is to be divided equally between the
parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to
marital misconduct after considering [a list of twelve
factors]. 34
The twelve factors included those from the previous stat-
30. Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis. 2d 631, 639, 242 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1976) (em-
phasis added).
31. Wis. STAT. § 247.07 (1977) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.07 (1981-
1982) (making irretrievable breakdown of the marriage the sole ground for divorce)).
32. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-
1982)).
33. The current version also excludes gifts from the property division.
34. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977). The list of factors was as follows:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate
economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care
services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from
the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to be-
come self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under s. 247.26 granting main-
tenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support pay-
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ute, as well as some common-law and new considerations .3
The "earning capacity" of each party, for example, had been
examined by the court in the past,36 as had the "tax conse-
quences" to the parties.3 7  The value of homemaking and
child care services had been recognized since Lacey v.
Lact. 3 8  The new factors set forth by the legislature in-
cluded the existence of any prenuptial or postnuptial agree-
ments between the parties, 39 and the desirability of awarding
the family home or "the right to live therein" to the party
having custody of any children.40  Perhaps the most signifi-
cant innovation was including the "contribution by one
party to the education, training or increased earning power
of the other."'4 1 By suggesting this factor the legislature ex-
hibited sympathy for the spouse who works to enable the
other spouse to achieve a professional degree or advanced
training and is left at a relative disadvantage when the mar-
riage breaks up.42
The expanded list of factors made for greater precision in
evaluating contributions to the marriage and in attaining eq-
ments under s. 247.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such
payments.
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension bene-
fits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the
marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agree-
ments shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be
binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party.
The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case deter-
mine to be relevant.




38. 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
39. Wis. STAT. § 247.255(11) (1977).
40. Id. § 247.255(7).
41. Id. § 247.255(5).
42. See Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Lundberg v.
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v Para-
dox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage, 66 MARQ. L.
REv. 495 (1983).
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uity between the parties.43  The fifty-fifty presumption was
made applicable to all noninherited property of the spouses
whether acquired before or during the marriage.44
C. Jasper v. Jasper
Since the fifty-fifty rebuttable presumption is operative
even as to premarital separate property,45 one would not be
surprised to see the presumption deemed rebutted, for eq-
uity's sake, in a case where one spouse brought significantly
more assets into the marriage than the other spouse. Con-
versely, one would expect the presumption to be more resis-
tant to rebuttal where neither spouse brought many assets
into the marriage. There, absent an obvious imbalance in
the efforts made or responsibilities undertaken by each of
the parties, the assets accumulated during the marriage
would be regarded as the product of their mutual effort and
would be apportioned accordingly. Likewise, where the trial
court in its discretion decided to return to the parties their
premarital separate property before effecting a division of
property acquired during the marriage, one would not ex-
pect rebuttal of the fifty-fifty presumption as to the latter
property in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
In Jasper v. Jasper46 the trial court did return to the
spouses the assets each brought into the marriage. Never-
43. Comment, Abolition of Guilt in Marriage Dissolution: Wisconsin's Adoption of
No-Fault Divorce, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 672, 686-88 (1978).
44. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977) provided:
Any property inherited by either party prior to or during the course of the
marriage shall remain the property of such party and may not be subjected to a
property division. . . except upon a finding that refusal to divide such prop-
erty will create a hardship on the other party or on the children of the marriage
... . The court shall presume that all other property. . is to be divided
equally between the parties ....
Including all but inherited property in the marital estate is by no means a majority
position nationwide. In some states with equitable distribution statutes only property
accumulated during the marriage may be distributed. Other states allow premarital
separate property or the increase in its value since marriage to be distributed. Still
other states allow separate property assets to be reached only when the marital prop-
erty assets are insufficient. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Ffty States. An Overview,
14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 251 (1981). "The most common method of dividing property is to
return to each party his or her separate property and then to divide the marital prop-
erty 'equitably."' Note, Property Division and Alimony.Awards.- A Survey ofStatutory
Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 415, 436-37 (1981).
45. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
46. 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982).
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theless, with respect to assets acquired during the marriage,
the fifty-fifty presumption was found to have been rebutted;
the homemaking spouse was deemed not to have made an
equal contribution.47
1. Factual Background and Discussion
Margaret and Elmer Jasper were married just under
eight years prior to their separation. It was Elmer's first
marriage, after he had been a bachelor for fifty years, and
Margaret's second. They had one child together, custody of
whom was awarded to Margaret. Elmer was a bank em-
ployee moonlighting in insurance sales. His annual earning
capacity, as estimated by the trial court, was in excess of
$32,000.48 Margaret had outside employment for nine
months during the marriage and was working as a nurse's
aid at the time of trial; the trial court estimated her earning
capacity at $6,500 per year presently and at over $8,000 per
year when the child became older.49 Both spouses contrib-
uted to the care of the child,50 but Mrs. Jasper "'[m]anaged
the operation of the home.' ,51
In dividing the couple's property the trial court first re-
turned to each party the assets each had brought to the mar-
riage. Second, the court divided the assets accumulated
during the marriage, awarding forty percent to Mrs. Jasper
and sixty percent to Mr. Jasper. Mrs. Jasper appealed the
unequal division, saying her award was inadequate and an
abuse of discretion.-2 She charged that the trial court im-
properly considered her prior marriage and ignored her
marital contributions because they were primarily domestic,
rather than financial, and because no "special demands" had
been made upon her. 3 In support of her allegations, Mrs.
Jasper relied on the trial court's language in its conclusions
of law. The trial court "'note[d] that no special demands
47. Id at 68, 318 N.W.2d at 797.
48. Id at 61, 318 N.W.2d at 793-94.
49. Id at 62, 318 N.W.2d at 794.
50. Id at 67-68, 318 N.W.2d at 796.
51. Id. at 61, 318 N.W.2d at 794.
52. Id at 66, 318 N.W.2d at 796.
53. Id
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were made upon petitioner nor special contributions made
by her in this, her second marriage, of just under eight years'
duration.' -54 The court further pointed out that "'the
financial accumulation was made almost totally through the
respondent's efforts as a bank employee, officer and insur-
ance entrepreneur. The situation clearly calls for any ine-
quality in the division of property to be made in favor of the
respondent.'"" On review by the court of appeals, the
above language was echoed.56
The supreme court found no abuse of discretion 57 in the
division of assets.5 8 It summarily dismissed Mrs. Jasper's al-
legation that the trial court was punishing her for having
been married before, saying this was "totally unsupported"
by the record.5 9 To Mrs. Jasper's allegation that the trial
court erred in demanding a "special contribution" on her
part, the court responded that no such burden had been
placed on her. It concluded that all the trial court meant by
its language was that
Elmer's contributions to the rather brief marriage tipped
the scales in his favor, justifying alteration of the equal
property division presumption. In noting the absence of
any special contributions made by Margaret, . . the trial
court intended nothing more than to comment that Mar-
garet's contributions to the marriage were not of such a na-
ture [as] to tip the scale back.60
54. Id
55. Id at 66-67, 318 N.W.2d at 796.
56. Id at 67, 318 N.W.2d at 796.
57. An abuse of discretion in a division of property or award of support occurs
when the trial court fails to consider proper factors or errs in its factual basis for the
division, or when the division is excessive or inadequate. Furthermore, abuse of dis-
cretion occurs when the court's determination is not demonstrably based upon the
facts in the record or is not made in reliance upon the applicable law. Id at 63-64,
318 N.W.2d at 795.
58. Id at 69, 318 N.W.2d at 797. However, the judgment was reversed and re-
manded on other grounds: (1) the propriety of a property award in the form of cash
installment payments over a period of years must be considered in light of the amount
the award could have produced if paid in full at the time of the judgment, but the
record did not reflect the trial court's having done so in this case; and (2) the family
support award was inadequate and an abuse of discretion. Id at 69-71, 318 N.W.2d
at 797-98.
59. Id at 69, 318 N.W.2d at 797.
60. Id at 68, 318 N.W.2d at 797.
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The opinion gives few facts regarding the parties' respec-
tive contributions other than that Mr. Jasper was virtually
the sole breadwinner and that Mrs. Jasper was a home-
maker. The court also noted that Elmer Jasper contributed
to the care of the child and that Margaret Jasper's domestic
activities were lightened by the four to six meals per week
the family ate in restaurants.6' If the court felt that the res-
taurant meals caused the division of labor in the marriage to
be unequal, it did not specifically say so.62 The court's chief
rationale in holding as it did was that Mrs. Jasper's domestic
services had not contributed to Mr. Jasper's attainment of
present earning capacity and had not caused her any loss of
earning capacity. The presumption of an equal division,
said the court, is partly founded on this scenario: "[Tlhe
homemaking partner has contributed services which have
enabled the financially supporting partner to achieve his or
her station in life, and in so doing the homemaking partner
has lost ground in the job market."63 That scenario was not
descriptive of the instant case. Elmer Jasper had achieved
his earning capacity over many years preceding the mar-
riage, and Margaret, who had been a homemaker and
mother in her previous marriage, had sustained no observa-
ble economic setback by marrying Elmer. 4 Under these cir-
cumstances the court felt the sixty-forty division was a
justifiable alteration of the statutory presumption.
2. Analysis
What the court glossed over was that the presumption
applies to the gross marital estate, which includes all the
property of the parties except gifts and inherited property.
61. Id at 67-68, 318 N.W.2d at 796-97.
62. In an earlier 1982 case the Wisconsin Supreme Court forecast its view of the
economic contribution of meal preparation. In refusing to terminate maintenance
payments to a still needy woman by a financially able ex-husband, the court said:
We note that, although the trial court found Mary's budget "high," it made
no comment on Floyd's spending over $400 per month (as compared with
Mary's food budget of $135 per month) eating meals out because he cannot
cook. We might suggest that it is not too late for Floyd to learn to cook if
Mary, after twenty-six years out of the labor force, is required to obtain job
training or schooling to enable her to become self-sufficient.
Vander Perren v. Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d 219, 229 n.5, 313 N.W.2d 813, 818 n.5
(1982).
63. Id at 68, 318 N.W.2d at 797.
64. Id
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[
When the trial court gave back to Margaret and Elmer the
value of the assets each brought into the marriage, it rejected
the presumption of an equal division of the estate. The
supreme court's attempt to justify the subsequent sixty-forty
division of property acquired during the marriage with the
observation that the facts of the case deviated from those
contemplated by the statutory presumption missed the point.
This supposedly atypical situation had already been reme-
died by the return of premarital assets. In other words, the
presumption had already been rebutted. If the sum total of
the Jaspers' marital property were taken into account, the
ratio of division would be far more unequal than sixty-forty.
Since the Jaspers' premarital separate property was re-
stored to each of them, the relevance of Elmer already hav-
ing achieved his station in life to the division of assets gained
in the course of the marriage is questionable. It also appears
inconsistent with the court's pronouncements dating back to
Lacey65 and reiterated in Jasper66 that marriage is a partner-
ship and that a full-time homemaking spouse's contributions
to that partnership can equal or exceed those of an employed
spouse. The court's holding implies instead that, with re-
spect to property division, homemaking is on a par with
outside employment only when the homemaking spouse's
services concurred in time with the employed spouse's ad-
vances in the workplace. In effect, this coincidence in time
becomes an extra test.
In a "typical" situation, where the parties marry in young
adulthood before any major career advances are made, the
working spouse's wage or salary increases and promotions
do coincide with the homemaking spouse's domestic endeav-
ors, and the court's "test" can be met. When, however, the
employed spouse has at the time of marriage already
achieved the major forward strikes of his or her career, as in
a late or second marriage, the court's ruling puts a home-
making spouse at a disadvantage. Even though the home-
making spouse in that situation provides comfort and well
being to the working spouse and enables him or her to con-
centrate on a job or profession, the supposed absence of a
65. Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 382, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970).
66. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d at 67, 318 N.W.2d at 796.
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contribution to the working spouse's current earning capac-
ity makes the domestic spouse a less than equal partner,
even as to assets accumulated during the span of the partner-
ship. Homemaking, under this test, becomes an activity
without independent economic worth in the eyes of the law.
Instead, its worth is dependent upon the appreciation in eco-
nomic value of the outside employment which it
complements.
A synchronization between one spouse's homemaking
and the other's career achievements was not a prerequisite to
a nearly equal division of the gross marital estate in a 1979
case under facts similar to those in Jasper. In Carly v.
Cart,67 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a wife's prop-
erty award of over forty-six percent of the estate after a nine
year marriage under pre-1977 law (no equal division was
presumed).68 The case stands in stark contrast to the une-
qual division of marital assets in Jasper.
The Carty marriage, like that of the Jaspers, was "late"
for the male spouse (though not a first marriage) and not
long in duration (nine years). Peter Carty was forty-two
years old and had accumulated an estimated estate of
$73,932.61 when he married Dorette, 23, who owned about
$5,200 worth of personal property.69 Insofar as a sizable es-
tate is a measure of career achievement, Mr. Carty, like Mr.
Jasper, had achieved his "station in life." The Cartys had no
dependent children from their previous marriages, nor were
any born to the marriage.70 Dorette Carty was primarily a
homemaker, although she worked periodically during the
marriage as a secretary, and Peter was the primary bread-
winner. 7 1 At the termination of the marriage, the trial court
awarded Mrs. Carty almost forty-seven percent of the par-
ties' accumulated assets, of which a substantial portion con-
sisted of Mr. Carty's premarital separate property. On
67. 87 Wis. 2d 759, 275 N.W.2d 888 (1979).
68. Id
69. Id at 762-63, 275 N.W.2d at 889.
70. Id at 762, 275 N.W.2d at 889.
71. Id at 763, 275 N.W.2d at 889.
72. Id at 764, 768, 275 N.W.2d at 890-91.
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appeal, the supreme court upheld the propriety of the
award.
73
Although the Cartys' marriage did not endure, the court
minimized the importance of length of marriage, saying that
the extent of the homemaking spouse's contribution to the
enterprise was more important than the number of years it
lasted.74 Without denigrating Mrs. Carty's contributions to
the marriage, but by way of comparison with the Jasper
case, it must be observed that her homemaking chores did
not include child care. The court stressed the fact that Mrs.
Carty had no separate estate and that her husband earned
almost three times as much as she did.75 In Jasper the earn-
ing capacity differential was even greater-Elmer's esti-
mated earning capacity was at least four times as much as
Margaret's.76 Furthermore, Dorette Carty was a qualified
and experienced secretary, fully able to support herself.77 By
contrast, Margaret Jasper had virtually no marketable
skills.78
A comparison of similar, but nonetheless unique, prop-
erty division cases has limited analytic value, for the weigh-
ing of equitable considerations is an imprecise business.
Because the trial court is best able to measure the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses,79 the rules
of judicial discretion give it wide latitude in choosing which
equitable factors to consider and how much weight to give
them. 0 Still, the foregoing comparison illustrates that aid-
ing the supporting spouse in achieving his or her station in
life was not always a prerequisite to a homemaking spouse
receiving half of the marital estate upon divorce.
73. Id at 770, 275 N.W.2d at 892.
74. Id at 769, 275 N.W.2d at 892.
75. Id at 770, 275 N.W.2d at 892.
76. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d at 61-62, 318 N.W.2d at 793-94.
77. Carty, 87 Wis. 2d at 763, 275 N.W.2d at 889.
78. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d at 61-62, 318 N.W.2d at 794.
79. See Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1982); Perrenoud
v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 260 N.W.2d 658, 661 (1978).
80. Carty v. Carty, 87 Wis. 2d 759, 275 N.W.2d 888 (1978). "The trial court need
not consider every one of the factors set forth in the statute or cases; moreover, it is up
to the trial court to determine the weight and effect of the various considerations." Id
at 768, 275 N.W.2d at 891.
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D. Conclusion
In Jasper v. Jasper8' the Wisconsin Supreme Court said
that part of the rationale behind the equal property division
presumption is that the homemaking partner has contributed
services which have made it possible for the supporting party
to achieve his or her station in life and, in so doing, the
homemaker has foregone economic opportunities. It is con-
ceded that these facts are relevant to the division of the gross
marital estate which comprises property brought into the
marriage as well as property earned during the span of mar-
riage. Achievement of station may well exhibit itself in the
form of a large amount of separate property brought into the
marriage, and this is one of the statutory, equitable consider-
ations relevant to property division.82 It is urged, however,
that station in life be given only a limited relevance with
respect to the division of property acquired in the course of
the marriage. Although the supporting party's earning ca-
pacity may have been attained without the help of the de-
pendent party, the financial contribution to the material
acquisitions of the marriage must not be given greater
weight than the nonfinancial contribution absent a blatant
imbalance in the respective efforts made. An unequal divi-
sion of assets gained during the marriage ought to be solidly
justified by the facts and based on substantially more than
the relative financial contributions of the parties and the fact
that the supporting party's earning capacity was achieved
prior to the marriage.
II. MAINTENANCE EVALUATION IN WISCONSIN: THE
REMOVAL OF FAULT As A CONSIDERATION
Maintenance, a term used in the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, 3 has been described as an "award made in a
[divorce] proceeding of payments from the future income or
earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of
the other."84 Maintenaifee is, often regarded "as a supple-
ment to what is derived from a distribution of marital prop-
81. 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982).
82. WIS. STAT. § 767.255(2) (1981-1982).
83. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1973).
84. Note, supra note 44, at 425.
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erty."8 5 Under the Wisconsin Family Code86 the court may,
in its discretion, order that maintenance payments be made
for a limited or an indefinite time, or not at all, depending
on a number of equitable factors, including the division of
property, the age and health of the parties, their respective
educational backgrounds and earning capacities, and the
feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become
self-supporting at a living standard similar to that enjoyed
during the marriage.87
A. History
The forerunner of maintenance was alimony (from the
Latin alimonia meaning "sustenance"), 88 a concept rooted in
85. Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275, 277-78 (1973).
86. Wis. STAT. ch. 767 (1981-1982).
87. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982) provides:
Maintenance payments. Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal
separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 767.02(1)(g) or (j),
the court may grant an order requiring maintenance payments to either party
for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255.
(4) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the
time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including ed-
ucational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the
time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to en-
able the party to find appropriate employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-
supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(7) The tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the mar-
riage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service
contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other com-
pensation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mu-
tual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning
any arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case deter-
mine to be relevant.
88. Note, Alimonyfor Men: The Thrust of Recent Decisions fthe Supreme Court
ofthe United States, 6 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 493, 495 (1981).
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the common-law duty of husband to support his wife.89 The
husband's duty began at marriage90 and did not cease upon
divorce, 9' except when the wife had committed uncondoned
adultery.92 The gender biased rules of alimony were reflec-
tive of economic reality.93 However, with the changing eco-
nomic position of women in modem society and the trend
toward gender neutral statutes came the beginnings of a
transformation in alimony law.
The first significant change in Wisconsin alimony law
came in 1971. The alimony statute was revised to allow its
award to either party out of the property or income of the
other.94 Again, adultery was a bar.95 The practical effect of
the change was negligible; the usual recipients of alimony
89. H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 14.1 (1968). Alimony can be traced back to the English ecclesiastical courts which
had jurisdiction over matrimonial actions prior to 1857. Since the church considered
marriage indissoluble, divorce was prohibited. The ecclesiastical courts did, however,
allow a type of legal separation known as divorce a mensa et thoro, or divorce "from
bed and board." Because a husband automatically gained control of his wife's in-
come and property with marriage, he had a corresponding duty at common law to
support her. The imposition of alimony was the ecclesiastical court's means of en-
forcing the husband's duty of support after the divorce from bed and board. Id
American courts have granted absolute divorce since colonial times and have
awarded alimony as an incident thereto. Id
90. "[The duty of the husband to support his wife] results from the marital rela-
tion. It is part of the marriage contract and is recognized as a legal duty in the stat-
utes and in the decisions of this court." Salinko v. Salinko, 177 Wis. 475, 478, 188
N.W. 606, 607 (1922) (citations omitted).
91. "It is well established. . . that the husband's duty to support his wife does
not cease upon their being divorced." Borchers v. Borchers, 254 Wis. 302, 305, 36
N.W.2d 79, 81 (1949).
92. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1975) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-
1982)); Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 79, § 24 (1849) (the earliest statutory authority for the
proposition). See also Tesch v. Tesch, 63 Wis. 2d 320, 331, 217 N.W.2d 647, 652
(1974); Pfingsten v. Pflingsten, 164 Wis. 308, 313, 159 N.W. 921, 923 (1916); State ex
rel Child v. Smith, 19 Wis. 531, 560 (1865) (supporting case law).
93. In fact, the reality continues to be that spousal support is more commonly
awarded to women as they are the more likely to be financially dependent. Weitz-
man, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Ali-
mony and Child SupportAwards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1221 n.140 (1981).
94. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971). Gender based alimony statutes were not de-
clared unconstitutional until nine years later. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a state statute which provided that husbands,
but not wives, could be ordered to pay alimony violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. By the time Orr came down, about 40 states had already
made their alimony statutes gender neutral. Freed & Foster, supra note 44, at 252.
95. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971), provided, in pertinent part, that "no alimony
shall be granted to a party guilty of adultery not condoned .... "
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continued to be female, and the court's use of gender in
enunciating the rules reflects that fact.96 The court's deter-
mination of the alimony award was generally based on the
needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay.97
The wife's needs were determined by her assets and income,
earning capacity, age and health, special needs, customary
station in life, and the age, health and special needs of any
children.98 The husband's ability to pay was determined by
his income, assets, debts, age and health.99 In addition, any
considerations relevant to property division were relevant to
the awarding of alimony.100
The second significant innovation in alimony law in Wis-
consin was the 1977 revision of the Family Code known as
the Divorce Reform Act.' 0' A new approach was taken to
alimony and a new name given to it. Maintenance, as it is
now called, was treated for the first time in a statute separate
from property division. 0 2 The factors relevant to its deter-
96. See cases cited infra notes 97-99.
97. Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 75 Wis. 2d 78, 90, 248 N.W.2d 417, 424 (1977); Hirth
v. Hirth, 48 Wis. 2d 491, 493, 180 N.W.2d 601, 602-03 (1970).
98. Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 25, 187 N.W.2d 867, 870 (1971); Hirth v.
Hirth, 48 Wis. 2d 491, 493-96, 180 N.W.2d 601, 602-04 (1970).
99. Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 25, 187 N.W.2d 867, 870 (1971); Hirth v.
Hirth, 48 Wis. 2d 491, 494-96, 180 N.W.2d 601, 602-04 (1970).
100. Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 128 N.W.2d 446, 449 (1964).
101. Ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560 (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. ch. 767
(1981-1982)).
102. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977) provides:
Maintenance payments. (1) Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or
legal separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 247.02(l)(g)
or (), the court may grant an order requiring maintenance payments to either
party for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering:
(a) The length of the marriage.
(b) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(c) The distribution of property made under s. 247.255.
(d) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the
time the action is commenced.
(e) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including ed-
ucational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the
time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to en-
able the party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-
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mination were, for the first time, codified.10 3
Some of the factors were already part of the case law,
such as age, health and earning capacityY°n Other factors
were new to maintenance evaluation but derived from previ-
ously codified property division considerations.10 5 These in-
cluded the educational level of each party at the time of
marriage and at the time the action was commenced, 1 6 the
feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become
self-supporting at a level comparable to that enjoyed during
the marriage, 0 7 the tax consequences to each party,'0 8 and
any prenuptial or postnuptial agreements made between the
parties. 0 9 While the earning capacity of the party seeking
maintenance was already a factor to which the award was
subject, the new statute directed the court to consider earn-
ing capacity in light of a number of specific variables: the
party's education, training, skills, experience, length of ab-
sence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for chil-
dren, and the time and expense of acquiring the education or
training for suitable employment." 0
B. Fault as a Consideration
1. The Statute
A second significant change in the maintenance statute
after the 1977 revisions was that adultery was no longer a
supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(g) The tax consequences to each party.
(h) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the mar-
riage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service
contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other com-
pensation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mu-
tual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning
any arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
(i) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine
to be relevant.
103. Compare Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977) with Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1975).
104. See Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977); see also supra text accompanying note 98.
105. Compare Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977) with Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977).
106. Wis. STAT. § 247.26(d) (1977).
107. Id § 247.26(f).
108. Id § 247.26(g).
109. Id § 247.26(h).
110. Id § 247.26(e).
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bar to the award. The statute did not make clear, however,
whether and to what extent marital misconduct was still a
relevant factor in the maintenance evaluation. Although
marital misconduct was explicitly barred from consideration
in the 1977 revision to the property division statute, i l' its
role was ambiguous in the maintenance statute. It was not
included in the list of relevant factors, but neither was it ex-
plicitly removed from consideration. Therefore, whether
misconduct could diminish a guilty spouse's maintenance
award or inflate the amount a guilty spouse was ordered to
pay to the maintenance recipient was an open question. 12
The omission of a conclusive reference to misconduct in
the statute was not a mere legislative oversight. As Justice
Abrahamson noted in Dixon v. Dixon," 13 the original assem-
bly bill included a provision that the court could not con-
sider the marital misconduct of either party in ordering
maintenance payments." 4 This provision was deleted by an
amendment to the bill." 5 A further proposed amendment
would have allowed the court to consider "such other factors
as the Court may in each individual case determine to be
11. Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977), provided, in pertinent part: "The court shall
presume that. . . property. . . is to be divided equally between the parties, but may
alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct ...."
112. The consideration of fault in making the financial settlement pursuant to
divorce is not necessarily incongruous with the elimination of fault grounds for the
divorce itself. In other jurisdictions where no-fault divorce has been instituted, but
where no statutory reference has been made to fault's effect on property rights, courts
have gone both ways. Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1978). Courts in California, Iowa
and Georgia have held that where the legislature provided for divorce on grounds of
irreconcilable differences but did not address the role of fault in alimony, support and
property division determinations, fault could not be considered therein. In re Mar-
riage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972); In re Marriage of
Juick, 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1971); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 238 Ga. 685,
235 S.E.2d 6 (1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 237 Ga. 886, 230 S.E.2d 272 (1976); In re
Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972). On the other hand, courts in
Alabama, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota and Texas (whose statutes
likewise were ambiguous on the role of fault in financial settlements pursuant to no-
fault divorce) have held that fault is a relevant consideration. Huggins v. Huggins, 57
Ala. App. 691, 331 So. 2d 704 (1976); Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky.
1973); Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973); Pe-
terson v. Peterson, 242 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 1976); Grant v. Grant, 226 N.W.2d 358
(N.D. 1975); Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
113. 107 Wis. 2d 492, 499, 319 N.W.2d 846, 849-50 (1982).
114. Wis. A.B. 100 (1979).
115. A. Amend. 10 to A. Substitute Amend. 1 to Wis. A.B. 100 (1977).
[Vol. 66:529
1983] PROPERTY DIVISION AND MAINTENANCE 549
relevant, including the marital misconduct of either
party." 1 6 This proposal, too, was defeated. No further clari-
fication was undertaken. In effect, the decision whether fault
was to be banished from maintenance determinations or
whether the case law prior to the Divorce Reform Act would
remain intact was left to the courts. The case law had held
that the marital misconduct of either spouse could be taken
into account in determining the alimony award, but it could
not be used in an overtly punitive fashion against the culpa-
ble party."i7
2. Dixon v. Dixon
The legislature's failure to provide direction in the matter
and the resulting statutory ambiguity was finally resolved in
Dixon v. Dixon. 118 There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
cided that evidence of misconduct was not admissible in the
determination of maintenance payments.
John and Ethyl Dixon had been married almost twenty-
five years at the time their divorce was commenced. Ethyl
held a bachelor's degree in education and was employed pe-
riodically as a substitute teacher. She suffered from hyper-
tension and nervousness which, according to two out of three
physicians who testified, would prevent her from holding a
full-time job."19 John, who held a master's degree in educa-
tion and was employed in a management position at a resort,
had an annual income of $21,700 when the divorce action
was commenced and $31,000 at the time of trial, not includ-
ing fringe benefits, a company car and an expense ac-
count. 20 John's monthly net pay was $1,490.5 1.121 The
couple had three children; two of them were minors whose
custody was awarded to Mrs. Dixon. She was also given
116. A. Amend. 21 to A. Substitute Amend. 1 to.Wis. A.B. 100 (1977).
117. Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 126, 128 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1964) (holding
that the trial court could use marital misconduct to resolve certain "economic ambi-
guities" against the erring partner but could not use it to "affirmatively punish" the
guilty party).
118. 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982).
119. Id at 494, 319 N.W.2d at 847.
120. Id
121. Id at 495, 319 N.W.2d at 847.
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maintenance of $500 per month for thirty months, plus $50
per week per child for support of the minor children. 22
Among Mrs. Dixon's contentions on appeal was that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of John's al-
leged adultery in its determination of the maintenance
award. She argued that section 767.26 of the Wisconsin
Statutes permitted the consideration of marital misconduct
in maintenance determinations insofar as it contained no ex-
press prohibition of same, and it contained a catch-all provi-
sion allowing the court to consider any factor deemed
relevant. 23 The legislature's omission of an express prohibi-
tion against consideration of misconduct, Mrs. Dixon ar-
gued, meant that it intended to retain prior law allowing its
consideration. 24 The supreme court rejected this argument,
holding that the legislature did not intend to allow the circuit
courts to consider marital misconduct in awarding mainte-
nance and setting forth three reasons for its holding.
First, the court observed that the declared intent of the
legislature in enacting the 1977 Divorce Reform Act was to
move away from assigning blame for the marriage failure
and to make the needs of the parties and their children the
focal point of the accompanying financial settlement. 125 Evi-
dence of misconduct of either of the parties is irrelevant to
an inquiry focusing on need. 126 To admit such evidence for
consideration, said the court, would be contrary to the legis-
lative purpose underlying the Act. 127
Second, prior case law allowing consideration of miscon-
duct in alimony decisions developed at a time when there
still existed the statutory prohibition against awarding ali-
mony to an adulterous wife. 28 This proscription was later
repealed by the legislature. 29 Thus, the statutory underpin-
ning for the rule allowing consideration of misconduct was
also eliminated. 30
122. Id at 495, 319 N.W.2d at 847-48.
123. Id at 495-96, 500-01, 319 N.W.2d at 848-50.
124. Id at 500-01, 319 N.W.2d at 850.
125. Id at 501, 319 N.W.2d at 851.
126. Id at 501-03, 319 N.W.2d at 851-52.
127. Id at 502, 319 N.W.2d at 851.
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Finally, even the prior case law limited the significance
of misconduct in determining the alimony award. Case law
had clearly established that the two main factors in awarding
alimony were the needs of the recipient and the ability of the
other spouse to pay.' 3' Those are economic factors, not
fault-based ones. Where evidence of misconduct was taken
into account, it was properly used only to resolve "'certain
ambiguities in economic position against the erring part-
ner.' ",132 It could not be used "as a device to affirmatively
punish the 'guilty' party."'' 33 The court pointed out that
"[w]hether misconduct is used to 'punish' or simply to make
'nonpunitive adjustments,' the end result was [sic] the same:
Parties guilty of misconduct did not do as well financially as
they would have done had they not been guilty of
misconduct."'134
The court concluded, for all of the foregoing reasons,
that the legislature did not intend that fault enter into the
determination of maintenance awards. 35 The evidence of
Mr. Dixon's adultery was, therefore, properly excluded.
C Conclusion
The Dixon court's decision not to include marital mis-
conduct as a factor in the determination of maintenance
awards is logically consistent with the spirit of Wisconsin's
no-fault divorce law and with the abolition of fault as a con-
sideration in the division of marital property. The court's
decision removes the last vestige of blame-assigning from
the marital dissolution proceeding and focuses the financial
settlement entirely on the end which it was designed to ac-
complish. Maintenance awards are based on the amount of
financial help a dependent spouse requires after the termina-
tion of the marital partnership. Since evidence of fault does
not illuminate an inquiry into economic need, it is properly
131. Id at 504, 319 N.W.2d at 852.
132. Id at 505, 319 N.W.2d at 852 (quoting Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120,
126, 128 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1964)).
133. Id
134. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d at 505, 319 N.W.2d at 852.
135. Id at 505, 319 N.W.2d at 853. See also Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110
Wis. 2d 188, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983) (cohabitation or misconduct held not the sole
consideration on a motion to terminate maintenance).
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excluded from that inquiry. The Dixon court made a ra-
tional policy decision which dispelled the uncertainty left by
the legislature's omission and comported with the philoso-
phy of no-fault divorce.
III. THE Two ROLES OF MAINTENANCE:
REHABILITATIVE DEVICE AND PERMANENT
AWARD BASED ON ECONOMIC NEED
A. The Changing Nature of Alimony
Postdivorce spousal support owes its existence to the
common-law rule that a husband was legally bound to sup-
port his wife 'til death did them part, even if divorce inter-
vened in the meantime. 36  Not only was the divorced
husband obligated to provide a basic level of sustenance, but
he was required, if possible, to support his former wife in the
manner to which she had become accustomed during the
marriage. 37 Alimony was a permanent obligation 38 be-
cause the wife usually did not possess the means or ability
for self-support.139
With the promulgation of the "no-fault" concept has
come the idea that the marital dissolution should be a clean
and harmonious break rather than a bitter and disruptive
one.' 40 To achieve that end, the financial settlement should
be premised not upon blame and making the "guilty" party
"pay," but upon the economic needs and abilities of the par-
ties.' 4 ' The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act encourages
136. See Paulsen, Support Rights Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REV.
709, 709 (1955-56).
137. See H. CLARK, JR., supra note 89, § 14.1. But see Anderson v. Anderson, 72
Wis. 2d 631, 242 N.W.2d 165 (1976); Radandt v. Radandt, 30 Wis. 2d 108, 140
N.W.2d 293 (1966); Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 128 N.W.2d 446 (1964); Bunde
v. Bunde, 270 Wis. 226, 70 N.W.2d 624 (1955); Ruppert v. Ruppert, 247 Wis. 528, 19
N.W.2d 874 (1945) (where the wife had separate income and property).
138. The only exceptions were for death, remarriage or changed circumstances.
Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis. 2d 631, 242 N.W.2d 165 (1976); Thies v. MacDonald,
51 Wis. 2d 296, 187 N.W.2d 186 (1971); Jordan v. Jordan, 44 Wis. 2d 471, 171 N.W.2d
385 (1969).
139. Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support.: In Need of a More Comprehensive
Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 493, 495 (1978).
140. Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REv. 559, 559-61 (1973).
141. Id at 566.
[Vol. 66:529
1983] PROPERTY DIVISION AND MAINTENANCE 553
the use of property division as the primary means of provid-
ing for the future financial needs of the parties. 142 For an
award of maintenance to be made under the Uniform Act,
certain findings of fact on the issue of need are a prerequi-
site: the trial court may award maintenance only when it has
found that the party seeking it lacks sufficient property to
meet his or her needs (including whatever marital property
has been awarded) and that the party cannot find employ-
ment or cannot work because of child care responsibilities. 143
Alimony is viewed today as primarily rehabilitative in
nature. 144 The financially independent party's duty to sup-
port results, not from that party's sex, but from his or her
ability and resources and the public policy against allowing
the dependent spouse to become a ward of the state. 45 The
duty of support, however, no longer necessarily continues
until death or remarriage. 146 The goal is to release the sup-
porting party from the obligation of support at such time as
the recipient party achieves economic self-sufficiency:
The payment of maintenance is not to be viewed as a per-
manent annuity. Rather, such payment is designed to
maintain a party at an appropriate standard of living,
under the facts and circumstances of the individual case,
until the party exercising reasonable diligence has reached
a level of income where maintenance is no longer
necessary. 147
142. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 91, 160 commission-
ers' comment (1973). Only where the marital property is insufficient to provide for
the parties' financial needs can an award of maintenance be made as a supplement.
Id commissioners' prefatory note at 93.
143. Id § 308.
144. Comment, supra note 139, at 495. Note, supra note 44, at 425.
145. Taake v. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 130, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975) (dissenting
opinion).
146. Permanent maintenance continues until death, remarriage or a change in
circumstances. See supra note 138.
147. Vander Perren v. Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d 219, 230,313 N.W.2d 813, 818
(1982). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 159, 254 N.W.2d 198, 209 (1977)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("It is desirable and necessary to encourage the recipient
spouse to become equipped and trained for return to the job market. Alimony is
unreliable. The paying spouse may lose employment, become ill, die, or avoid pay-
ment. Alimony can be harmful psychologically and economically to both parties.").
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B. Limited v. Permanent Maintenance
The idea of using postdivorce spousal support as a reha-
bilitative tool finds expression in Wisconsin and many other
states in the form of statutory authorization for "limited"
maintenance.148 This allows the court to fix a time limit on
the award as an alternative to granting maintenance for an
indefinite period. Indefinite, or permanent, alimony is ap-
propriate where future employment is unlikely due to age,
illness or other factors.149 However, if the dependent spouse
has the potential to be self-supporting and is not unduly bur-
dened with long term child custodial responsibilities, the
maintenance award's duration should be related to the
length of time necessary for that spouse to find a job or to
"upgrade [his or] her educational qualifications in order to
secure employment." '15
Prior to 1971 the Wisconsin statutes authorized only per-
manent alimony,' 5' or alimony whose modification could be
predicated only upon a material change in the needs of the
party receiving the support or in the financial resources of
the party paying the support.152 In 1971 the legislature
amended the alimony statute to allow the court to grant ali-
mony for a limited period of time. 153 When an award of lim-
148. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982). "IT]he court may grant an order requiring
maintenance payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time. .. ."
See also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08
(West Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981).
149. See, e.g., Volosin v. Volosin, 382 So. 2d 733 (Fla. App. 1980) (award of
rehabilitative alimony to a 61 year old divorced wife was improper where she was in
poor health, with no apparent means of support, and there was no suggestion how she
could be rehabilitated to become self-supporting). But see Watkins v. Watkins, 209
Neb. 14, 305 N.W.2d 894 (1981) (although a divorced wife had not worked since
marriage, had skills qualifying her only to waitress and do office work, had had ileos-
tomy operation performed on her three years earlier, had phlebitis in one leg and had
cataracts in both eyes, court upheld adequacy of award of limited alimony, saying
that although she had some health problems, there was no indication she was
unemployable).
150. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also
Primato v. Primato, 274 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
151. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1969).
152. See cases cited supra note 138.
153. Act of April 11, 1972, ch. 220, § 12, 1971 Wis. Laws 641, 644 (amending
Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971)) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982)).
The amended statute made no provision for permanent alimony; nevertheless, the
courts continued to award it. This practice was upheld in Czaicki v. Czaicki, 73 Wis.
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ited maintenance is proper, should it still be subject to
modification or extension at a later date? Originally, such
limited awards were not subject to revision. When the legis-
lature amended the alimony statute in 1971 to provide for a
limited award, it also amended the revision of judgment stat-
ute to provide that a judgment providing for alimony for a
limited period "shall not thereafter be revised or altered."' 15
Presumably, the legislature felt both parties would be able to
plan their lives better with the certain knowledge that the
maintenance payments would not continue indefinitely into
the future. 55
The Divorce Reform Act of 1977156 once again changed
the law. The revision of judgment statute was amended to
provide that any judgment of maintenance could be re-
vised.15 7 This provision was the subject of the second issue
certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dixon v.
Dixon.158
2. Dixon v. Dixon
In its conclusions of law pursuant to the Dixons' divorce
judgment, the circuit court stated that the $500 per month
for thirty months awarded to Mrs. Dixon as maintenance
was not to be increased or decreased by virtue of any change
in the economic circumstances of either of the parties. 159
Mrs. Dixon argued on appeal that prohibition of modifica-
tion was in violation of the statutes which expressly author-
2d 9, 242 N.W.2d 214 (1976), wherein the amended statute was interpreted as in-
tended not to remove the trial court's right to impose permanent alimony, but rather
to give the court the option of granting either permanent or limited alimony. The
court's holding was reflected in the 1977 amendment to the statute which explicitly
provided that maintenance could be granted "for a limited or indefinite length of
time." Ch. 105, § 42, 1977 Wis. Laws 572 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1977))
(current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982)).
154. Act of April 11, 1972, ch. 220, § 15, 1971 Wis. Laws 641, 645 (amending
Wis. STAT. § 247.32 (1971)) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.32 (1981-1982)).
155. See Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 146, 254 N.W.2d 198, 203 (1977).
156. Ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560 (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. ch. 767
(1981-1982)).
157. Id at 575 (amending Wis. STAT. § 247.32 (1977)) (current version at Wis.
STAT. § 767.32 (1981-1982)).
158. 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982).
159. Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 495, 319 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1982).
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ize revision of any maintenance award, making no
distinction between limited and indefinite awards.160
The supreme court agreed with Mrs. Dixon, ruling in
favor of modification of limited awards so long as the peti-
tion for revision is filed before the maintenance payments
terminate.' 6' The court recognized that its holding would
tend to obscure the difference between limited and indefinite
maintenance awards. The prohibition against revision of
limited awards was the "primary distinction" under the old
statutes between limited and indefinite alimony. 62 It was
also the chief advantage of limited alimony. Both parties
were afforded certainty as to their "financial rights and re-
sponsibilities,"'' 63  and judicial economy was promoted
through a reduction in future court hearings. 164  Neverthe-
less, the plain meaning of the statute led the court to con-
clude that the values of "economic certainty and reduced
litigation" were not intended to be achieved "at the expense
of spouses whose needs might change after judgment is en-
tered."'165 Thus, under the court's ruling, Wisconsin circuit
courts are empowered to revise maintenance payments, even
when originally awarded for only a limited time.166
160. Id at 506, 319 N.W.2d at 853.
161. Id at 508, 319 N.W.2d at 854.
162. Id at 507-08, 319 N.W.2d at 853-54.
163. Id at 507, 319 N.W.2d at 853.
164. Id
165. Id at 508, 319 N.W.2d at 854.
166. Id Dixon was not the first case in which the supreme court weakened the
concept of limited maintenance. The court had already made it difficult to award
limited maintenance to custodial mothers of children. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis.
2d 58, 308 N.W.2d 16 (1981). The court in Hartung said it recognized the right of
such mothers to stay at home. Id at 67-68, 306 N.W.2d at 21. Eleanor Hartung, the
custodial parent of three young children, had been awarded maintenance of $200 a
month for eighteen months plus child support. Id at 62, 306 N.W.2d at 18. The trial
court's rationale for the limited maintenance award was that Eleanor would not want
to "sit around for the rest of her life" and would "turn into a vegetable if she did that
anyhow." Id at 62-63, 306 N.W.2d at 21. Eleanor contended on appeal that the size
and duration of the award would require her to immediately seek employment to
meet her undisputed monthly expenses. Id at 62, 306 N.W.2d at 19. The supreme
court reversed the award, finding the duration "arbitrary" and both the amount and
duration unsupported by a reasoned consideration of the facts in the record and the
statutory guidelines. Id at 66-68, 306 N.W.2d at 20-22. The court found no evidence
in support of the trial court's apprehension that mothers of small children who remain
at home to care for them turn into vegetables. Id at 67, 306 N.W.2d at 21.
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3. Effects of Dixon on the Principle of Rehabilitation
Although the Dixon ruling may seem inconsistent with
the principle of rehabilitative support, other jurisdictions
with limited or rehabilitative forms of alimony similarly al-
low modification on the theory of the continuing jurisdiction
of the trial court, 67 or where the trial court retains jurisdic-
tion to modify the award in the future, 68 or where it ex-
pressly declines to preclude modification in the alimony
decree itself.169
There exists the possibility that the availability of modifi-
cation of a limited award of maintenance may act as a disin-
centive for the dependent party to become self-supporting.
On petition for extension, evidence of a lack of reasonable
efforts to find employment should weigh in disfavor of the
petitioning spouse. California has held that refusal to seek
employment is a factor for the court to take into considera-
tion on petition for modification.170 This is certainly a logical
extension of the principles behind the limited award. It has
been said that the primary purpose of limited maintenance is
to assist the employable divorced person in regaining a use-
ful role in society "through vocational or therapeutic train-
ing or retraining."' 7' Rehabilitative or limited maintenance
is "not a substitute for either unemployment compensation
or retirement benefits. The award is clearly an incentive to
assist one in reclaiming employment skills outside the home
which have atrophied during the marital relationship."'' 72
Although the supreme court in Dixon did not discuss
burdens of proof on petition for revision or the necessity of a
good faith effort to become self-supporting (when self-sup-
port is possible), it has said in other recent cases that such
167. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 107.135 (1981-1982).
168. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Jacobs, 102 Cal. App. 3d 990, 162 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980).
169. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.'ANN. § 46b-86 (West Supp. 1982).
170. In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972).
When evidence exists that the party to be supported has unreasonably delayed
or refused to seek employment consistent with her or his ability, of course, that
factor may be taken into consideration by the trial court in fixing the amount
of support in the first instance or in modification proceedings.
Id at 896, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
171. Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
172. Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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good faith efforts are relevant to the awarding or termination
of maintenance. For example, in Bahr v. Bahr17 3 the court
said: "When the dependent party is capable of accepting
reasonably available, gainful employment, we do not believe
the dependent party can avoid such employment and simply
rely upon the supporting party to provide a standard of liv-
ing for the dependent party comparable to that enjoyed dur-
ing marriage."' 17 4 And in Vander Perren v. Vander Perren175
the court said that "a party's lack of initiative or effort to
become self-supporting is a relevant factor for a court to
consider in awarding or terminating maintenance." 17 6 Thus,
even though Dixon effectively tolls the death knell for the
truly limited maintenance award, the decision is consistent
with the role of maintenance in remedying need and is not
necessarily inconsistent with the award's rehabilitative func-
tion. On petitions for revision, it is reasonable to expect that
circuit courts will take into account the petitioner's reason-
able efforts to become self-supporting.
C The Permanent Maintenance A ward
Where rehabilitative, or limited, maintenance is rejected
by the court in favor of a permanent award to a former
spouse whose capacity for self-support is found wanting, is
that spouse entitled to be maintained until death or remar-
riage in the affluent style of living he or she enjoyed during
the marriage? A spouse capable of rehabilitation may never
reach the marital standard of living, yet he or she is still en-
couraged to become at least a self-sufficient breadwinner. In
the ordinary case, not even the wage earning spouse can live
at the same socioeconomic level after divorce. "Whether or
not two can live as cheaply as one, two persons living under
two roofs cannot live as well as the same two persons living
under one roof."'177
Yet, in Bahr v. Bahr17 8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that a maintenance award of $18,000 per year to a di-
173. 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
174. Id at 83, 318 N.W.2d at 397-98.
175. 105 Wis. 2d 219, 313 N.W.2d 813 (1982).
176. Id at 229, 313 N.W.2d at 818.
177. Hirth v. Hirth, 48 Wis. 2d 491, 494, 180 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1970).
178. 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
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vorced wife whose former husband earned over $300,000 per
year was so unreasonably low under the circumstances as to
constitute an abuse of discretion. 7 9 In the same opinion the
court proposed that an award to the dependent party of fifty
percent of the parties' combined incomes might be a reason-
able starting point in maintenance evaluations. 80
1. Factual Background of Bahr
Darlene and Robert Bahr were married for twenty-four
years prior to their divorce in 1979. Their four children were
all adults living outside the home. Robert Bahr, aged fifty-
one at the time of the divorce, was a physician specializing in
radiology with a gross annual income of over $300,000.18
Darlene Bahr, fifty, had a college degree qualifying her for
employment as a dietician, and from 1973 until just before
the divorce she worked part-time as a dietary consultant
earning up to $5,000 per year. 82 Except for that employ-
ment, she was a homemaker. She testified at the divorce
trial that she had medical problems, including arthritis and
back "ailments," which made it hard for her to work for long
periods of time.8 3
The trial court awarded Mrs. Bahr forty-six percent of
the net marital estate (after attorney fees), 184 or $513,279.50,
plus $1,500 per month permanent maintenance. 8 5 On ap-
peal, Mrs. Bahr challenged the property award's propriety
and the maintenance award's adequacy. The court of ap-
peals agreed with her that errors in computation had been
made in the property division, and it ordered the case re-
manded for reconsideration thereof. 86 In addition, it or-
179. Id at 85, 318 N.W.2d at 398.
180. Id at 84-85, 318 N.W.2d at 398.
181. Id at 75, 318 N.W.2d at 394.
182. Id at 74-75, 318 N.W.2d at 393.
183. Id at 74, 318 N.W.2d at 393.
184. The trial court ordered Dr. Bahr to contribute $33,779.40 toward Mrs.
Bahr's attorney fees. Id at 75, 318 N.W.2d at 394.
In Wisconsin and other jurisdictions the increase in factors to be considered by the
court under equitable distribution statutes has led to a concurrent escalation in attor-
ney fees and costs for expert witnesses. In New York, for example, fees for a typical
divorce now run between $10,000 and $20,000. Goodman, With New Law, Divorce
Fees Soar, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1983, at C1, col. 1.
185. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 75, 318 N.W.2d at 394.
186. Id at 76 n.1, 318 N.W.2d at 394 n.1.
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dered the trial court to reconsider whether the maintenance
award should be modified to reflect the changes in the divi-
sion of property, since the two awards cannot be made "in a
vacuum."' 8 17 The court of appeals said, however, that it did
not consider the maintenance award so inadequate as to con-
stitute an abuse of discretion. 8 8 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court disagreed and held that the award of maintenance in
the amount of $1,500 per month was "unconscionably low
and an abuse of discretion."'' 8 9
2. The Relevance of Ability to Pay and Marital Lifestyle
As a general rule, maintenance awards are "based upon
the needs and income producing abilities of the parties, with
consideration of other supplementary factors." 90 Recent de-
cisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, have re-
duced the importance of need in the maintenance
determination.' 9'
A person's concept of his or her own "needs" is deter-
mined in large measure by the style of living he or she is
accustomed to, and it is for this reason that many courts take
the marital living standard into account in determining
maintenance awards. 92 The standard of living prior to di-
vorce has long been considered relevant under Wisconsin
case law, 93 and the present maintenance statute explicitly
directs the court to consider "[t]he feasibility that the party
187. Id at 77, 318 N.W.2d at 394 (quoting the unpublished court of appeals
opinion).
188. Id at 77, 318 N.W.2d at 394.
189. Id at 77, 318 N.W.2d at 395.
190. Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 70, 318 N.W.2d 792, 797 (1982).
191. For example, no longer is need an absolute prerequisite to an award of
maintenance. Under Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982)
and Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982), even a self-supporting
spouse may be entitled to maintenance. Both Lundberg and Brown concerned wives
who had put their husbands through medical school. The supreme court held that
maintenance could be used as a compensatory device for material contributions and
foregone opportunities that could not be fully compensated through the property
division.
192. Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. App. 1977); Com-
ment, supra note 139, at 502. Not all jurisdictions consider the marital lifestyle rele-
vant. Freed & Foster, supra note 44, at 254.
193. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981); Anderson v.
Anderson, 72 Wis. 2d 631, 242 N.W.2d 165 (1976); Radandt v. Radandt, 30 Wis. 2d
108, 140 N.W.2d 293 (1966); Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 128 N.W.2d 446 (1964).
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seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at a stan-
dard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to
achieve this goal."' 19 4 In Bahr v. Bahr the supreme court said
for the first time that particular weight should be attached to
the marital standard of living in cases where a high standard
existed during the marriage. The court interpreted the
meaning of the word "enjoyed" in the maintenance statute
as pertaining to situations where the parties did, in fact, have
an "acceptable" standard of living. The court said that that
standard "should be maintained if, under the facts and cir-
cumstances of the situation, such a result can be accom-
plished without unreasonable hardship to the supporting
party."' 195
Although the marital living standard and the supporting
party's ability to pay are well-established factors in the de-
termination of maintenance, it can be argued that they have
only a limited relevance if, indeed, the premier value to be
served by the award is meeting the recipient's needs. Even
conceding that an affluent lifestyle can augment an individ-
ual's notion of life's "necessities," there is a point at which
any reasonable person can distinguish between necessity and
luxury. It is at that point that further consideration of the
marital standard of living becomes inconsistent with deter-
mining an award ostensibly based on need. The same can be
said of the supporting party's ability to pay. That ability is
necessarily relevant insofar as it may enable the dependent
ex-spouse to receive more than just a bare level of suste-
nance. However, once a level of support beyond mere suste-
nance has been achieved, it is at least arguable that the
supporting party's ability to contribute more should not be a
material factor in determining the award's adequacy (apart
from situations where the maintenance recipient made sig-
nificantly greater material contributions during the marriage
to aid the other spouse in attaining his or her present greater
earning capacity).196
194. WIs. STAT. § 767.26(6) (1981-1982).
195. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 83, 318 N.W.2d at 397.
196. See Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982), where the
court held that maintenance is not to be denied merely because a spouse is capable of
self-support. Judith Brown had supported herself and her husband while he went to
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The ability to contribute more was clearly present in
Bahr v. Bahr, and the court appears to have attributed great
weight to it. For example, in addressing Dr. Bahr's argu-
ment that increasing the award would reduce Mrs. Bahr's
incentive to find employment, 97 the court noted that she had
left her part-time job just before the divorce but said that
voluntary termination of employment by the party claiming
dependence would be significant only "[iln a case where the
parties have a modest amount of income-producing property
to divide and a limited income was earned by the party from
whom support was sought."'' 98 In other words, where there
are abundant assets and the supporting party has a large in-
come, the relevance of the "dependent" party's ability to
hold a job is diminished. In a later passage the court said:
Because of the length of the Bahr marriage, the age of Mrs.
Bahr, her absence from significant employment for many
years, and her medical problems, Mrs. Bahr's failure to
have or seek employment, particularly where the income of
Dr. Bahr is so substantial, is of little consequence to the
maintenance determination in this case.' 99
The court never discussed why the award was "uncon-
scionably low" except in terms of Dr. Bahr's capacity to pay
more. Nowhere was it suggested that Mrs. Bahr could not
live on $18,000 per year. Indeed, her annual income, with
the inclusion of property division installment payments, was
almost twice that amount. Although the division of property
is a statutorily relevant factor in maintenance evaluation,2°°
the supreme court ignored Mrs. Bahr's substantial property
award.
In short, need was not a palpable factor in the court's
holding that Mrs. Bahr's maintenance award was inade-
quate. Instead of reviewing the propriety of the award on
the basis of Mrs. Bahr's needs and whether the award met
medical school and had deferred her own career goals. The court said it was only fair
that she receive a maintenance award that would allow her to attain these goals just as
she had enabled her husband to achieve his.
197. Dr. Bahr's attorney also argued "that increasing Mrs. Bahr's award would
'reduce her incentive to find a proper mate."' Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 83, 318 N.W.2d at
397 (quoting Dr. Bahr's attorney).
198. Id
199. Id at 84, 318 N.W.2d at 398 (emphasis added).
200. Wis. STAT. § 767.26(3) (1981-1982).
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them, the court assessed the award on the basis of its dispro-
portionality to the amount Dr. Bahr was capable of paying
and on the basis of the affluent living standard enjoyed prior
to the divorce. The foundation rationale for reversal of a
maintenance award on grounds of inadequacy ought to be
the insufficiency of the award to meet the recipient's reason-
able needs.
Also inconsistent with the concept of maintenance as an
award based on economic necessity is the court's radical new
guideline for maintenance evaluation. The court said that
"[i]t would seem reasonable for the trial court to begin the
maintenance evaluation with the proposition that the depen-
dent partner may be entitled to fifty percent of the total earn-
ings of both parties. ' 20 1 The court went on to say that this
percentage could be "adjusted following reasoned considera-
tion of the statutorily enumerated maintenance factors." 202
The court did not elaborate on when an award of fifty per-
cent of the parties' earnings would be appropriate. It merely
said that while the starting point was important, it was not
determinative and that the important thing was the equita-
bleness of the result reached.0 3
Fifty percent of the total earnings of both parties in the
Bahr case would, of course, be half of Dr. Bahr's income, or
about $150,000 annually. The obvious complication of the
new guideline is that it may, under some circumstances, fur-
nish an ex-spouse substantially more than a reasonable level
of support. How or why a former spouse might be "entitled"
to such a level of support is the issue raised by the court's
guideline-a guideline for which it offered no legal, equita-
ble, or philosophical underpinnings.
As the court itself acknowledged in Bahr, the fifty per-
cent starting point in property division awards is founded on
the notion that marriage is a partnership and on the pre-
sumed joint contribution of the partners toward the acquisi-
tion of marital property.204 After dissolution of marriage,
201. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 84-85, 318 N.W.2d at 398.
202. Id at 85, 318 N.W.2d at 398. On remand the trial court awarded Mrs. Bahr
$10,000 per month as her share of his earnings. Dr. Bahr's income had increased to
$420,450 in 1982. Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 19, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 1.
203. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 85, 318 N.W.2d at 398.
204. See id at 81-82, 318 N.W.2d at 397.
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however, whatever is acquired by either of the parties is ac-
complished through each party's individual efforts. The
proposition of equal entitlement to these assets absent the
theoretical basis of partnership and equal contribution will
be difficult for some to accept. If marriage is a partnership
which, upon divorce, is liquidated, there can be no "entitle-
ment" by either ex-spouse to any set percentage, even if only
a starting point, of the post-divorce income of the other. Eq-
uity may dictate that the spouse disadvantaged by the di-
vorce be awarded some portion of this income, but the
portion awarded should arguably be determined on the basis
of the party's needs. If an award of maintenance, under the
modem view, "is not a continuation of the right of one
spouse to be supported by the other during marriage," 205
how can the new fifty percent guideline be justified?
The court in Bahr stressed the importance of an equita-
ble result, and that is the only clue in the opinion to under-
standing the new maintenance guideline. When does a
maintenance award of fifty percent of the working spouse's
income achieve an equitable result? One can surmise, look-
ing at the facts of Bahr from which the guideline comes, that
the court is particularly sympathetic to the long-married
homemaker whose age and/or inexperience and/or ill health
either preclude self-support or guarantee a meager level of
support.0 6 Bahr also evidences the court's sympathy for the
205. Carr v. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40, 46 (N.D. 1980).
206. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also exhibited sympathy for the younger
homemaker with custodial responsibilities for children. See Hartung v. Hartung, 102
Wis. 2d 58, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981). In enunciating the right of mothers with small
children to stay at home, the court may have been moved by knowledge of the severe
economic and emotional impact of divorce on women and children. Dramatic down-
ward mobility and mental and physical stress mark the postdivorce lives of a majority
of divorced women. Studies have shown that in the first year after divorce the stan-
dard of living of divorced women falls by 73% (while that of divorced men rises by
42%). Weitzman, supra note 93, at 1251. Seventy percent of divorced women in a
national sample said they worried about making ends meet. Id at 1252 n.229. Chil-
dren of divorced women feel the strain, not only materially, but also in terms of their
mothers' diminished time and energy. Id at 1261.
Perhaps Hartung and Bahr can be understood as the making of law which con-
forms to existing sociological patterns. In the ideal society women would enjoy
equality with men in the labor market, and employers would accommodate the needs
of the family by offering day-care on the work premises, job sharing, and flexible
hours. But since most employers are not so obliging, and since women tend to work
in predominantly "female" occupations with below-average pay, id at 1230, the court
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ex-spouse who lived comfortably and well during a long
marriage and for whom divorce means a greater than usual
reduction in circumstances. Perhaps the court views the
long-married, dependent spouse as having developed a "reli-
ance interest" in the breadwinning spouse's future income 20 7
Under that view, equity requires that the expectation of life-
time support be honored, even though the expectation of a
lifetime marriage has not been fulfilled. In addition, the ca-
reer homemaker has, in a real sense, contributed to the other
spouse's future earnings by performing the domestic and so-
cial tasks that assisted the other in ascending the career
ladder.
Bahr aims to compensate the dependent ex-spouse for
the limited earning power he or she possesses after years of
absence from the workplace. Bahr appears to view the
breadwinning spouse's future earning capacity as one of the
major assets of a lengthy marriage. In the future, "doing"
equity between the divorcing parties may require more than
an equal division of the marital estate and a subsistence level
of maintenance; it may require an equal division of the
breadwinning spouse's future earnings.
IV. SUMMARY
The financial settlement upon dissolution of a marriage
may be understood as having two functions. It is a method,
first, of equitably dividing the proceeds of a defunct joint
enterprise and, second, of insuring that neither party's post-
divorce standard of living is unfairly reduced. With respect
to the equitable division of assets, the Jasper decision sanc-
tions an unequal division of assets gained during the course
of the marriage between a homemaking spouse and a wage-
earning spouse when the latter had already achieved his or
her station in life before entering into the marriage. The
concept of marriage as an equal partnership cannot help but
be eroded by a decision which approves an unequal division
of property based on little more than the relative financial
contributions of the parties. With respect to providing for
is fashioning a law of maintenance that compensates divorced women for their infer-
ior economic position.
207. Interview with Attorney Lucy Cooper, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Sept. 1982).
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the parties' long term financial needs, the Dixon decision
removes the last vestige of fault consideration in evaluating
maintenance awards and removes any barrier to modifying
such awards in the event the parties' needs change. While
the Dixon holdings can be interpreted consistently with the
contemporary view of maintenance as a rehabilitative award
founded on need, the Bahr decision diminishes the impor-
tance of need as a factor in determining the maintenance
award where the payor has the ability to maintain the recipi-
ent at a level of affluence.
Under these recent decisions, maintenance becomes the
great equalizer. Disparity between the parties in income
producing power is to be remedied by splitting what the
court seems to view as an asset of the marital estate-
namely, the supporting spouse's future earning capacity.
While these decisions regrettably do not encourage
postdivorce independence, they commendably ameliorate
the decline in economic position which divorce inflicts on
former dependents.
LAUREL BARNES GURTUNCA
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